Constraints on the Shapley Value for a Coalitional Control System

Authors:

F.J. Muros, J.M. Maestre, E. Algaba, T. Álamo & E.F. Camacho

Conference:

European Control Conference

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6862574&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D6862574

Abstract:

We introduce several refinements in the design method of a coalitional control scheme for linear systems recently proposed. In this scheme, the network topology is modified in order to attain a trade-off between communication burden and overall system performance. In particular, all the communication links with low contribution to the overall performance are disconnected. Likewise, the control law has to be adapted to these changes. Given that the coalitional control scheme can be posed as a cooperative game, it is possible to apply classical game theory results to gain an insight into the control problem. In this work, we show how the design method can be modified in order to include constraints regarding the game theoretical properties of the aforementioned scheme.